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Abstract
In this thesis we consider emissions trading under various market imperfections such
as uncertainty over permit price, imperfect competition and noncompliance. First, we
study the effects of uncertain permit price on the firms choice of emission intensive and
clean inputs in an multi-input production process. We also assess the risk aversion factors
of some Finnish heat and power producers. Second, we study imperfect competition in
output and permit markets with a two-stage model, where output decision is made before
permit trades. The emphasis is on the strategic interaction between firms and on the effi-
ciency increasing regulation. Third, we turn back to uncertainty and analyse the welfare
difference between emissions trading and emission tax, when some of the firms may be
noncompliant. The main finding is that welfare is greater with emission tax than with
emissions trading, when at least one firm is noncompliant. Finally, we extend some ex-
isting models of permit banking and borrowing to encompass also noncompliant behavior
of firms. Here, we analyse the incentives of compliant firms to become noncompliant at
some point in time and also the time paths of the choice variables.
Keywords: Emissions trading; emission tax; uncertainty; mean-variance analysis; market power; duopoly;
regulation; compliance; monitoring and enforcement; welfare; banking; intertemporal choice.
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1 Introduction
Emissions trading is based on a simple but insightful idea. A cap is imposed by the
regulator on the industry’s emissions, which is distributed among firms as permits. The
firms are then allowed to trade these permits among themselves. This means that the
firms decide how much each of them abates, instead of regulator deciding their abatement
levels. Montgomery (1972) was the first to demonstrate that emissions trading is a cost-
efficient instrument to control global uniformly mixed pollutants.1 Since the first modest
applications of emissions trading the number of emissions trading programs on airborne
emissions and water quality has been growing rapidly.
Cost-efficiency is one of the key reasons why countries have adopted emissions trading.
Most recently, emissions trading is used as a climate change mitigation policy in the form
of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU-ETS). The observed features of the
existing programs have raised the question whether the cost-efficiency property actually
holds or not. Therefore, one needs to examine the assumptions behind efficient emissions
trading market and cost-efficient emission reduction. This amounts to studying the role
of various market imperfections. To put it briefly, this thesis studies the effect of different
market imperfections on emissions trading market.
I begin my discussion with the cost-efficiency property of emissions trading and the
main assumptions behind it. The given emissions cap is achieved in a cost-efficient way,
when the polluting firms choose their emissions such that marginal abatement costs are
equalized across firms. The assumptions on the emissions trading market include: the
participating firms are price takers in all relevant markets such as permit, output and
input markets; the firms operate under certainty; the firms are compliant and there are
no transaction costs related to permit trades. Under these assumptions, firms choose
1For cost-efficiency see Baumol and Oates (1988).
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their emissions such that the permit price equals the marginal abatement costs, implying
that marginal abatement costs are equalized among firms. Because of this, we say that
emissions trading is a cost-effective instrument to control pollution. An important feature
of emissions trading is that the initial allocation of permits has no effect on the equilibrium
choices of the firms. Note that under the above assumptions also emission tax is cost-
efficient.
The main theme of this thesis is to reconsider the basic emission trading model: I
examine the effects of permit price uncertainty, market power and noncompliance on the
efficiency properties of emissions trading. I next survey the most important studies on
these topics, and present typical models from the literature and discuss questions waiting
for further study.
2 Related literature
2.1 Price uncertainty
The theory of the firm has typically examined the impact of uncertainty showing up in
the output price or in the input prices. The seminal contribution is Sandmo (1971) who
models a competitive firm under output price uncertainty. His most important result
is that the optimal output of a risk-averse firm under uncertainty is smaller than (or
equal to) the output, when output price is equal to its expected value. Similar result is
obtained by Ben-David et al. (2000) in the context of emissions trading: they assume
that the permit price is uncertain and find that abatement levels differ from the ones
where the permit price equals its expected value. This has an important implication:
cost-efficiency property of emissions trading may not hold anymore. This result can be
derived for example with the following model. Assume that the permit price is uncertain
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and that the problem of the firm is to
max
{e}
EU
(
pi(e)− pˆ(e− e0)
)
, s.t. e ≥ 0, (1)
where e are the emissions of the firm acting as the choice variable, E is the expectation
operator and U is the utility function. The function pi is the benefit function of emissions
and it is usually assumed to be strictly increasing and strictly concave in emissions. The
parameters pˆ and e0 are the uncertain permit price and the initial allocation of permits for
the firm, respectively. With this model it can be shown that at an interior optimum the
marginal abatement costs differ from the expected permit price for a risk-averse permit
seller or buyer.
In the above models there are no forward markets and therefore in Sandmo’s model
risk aversion affects the choice of output (or the choice of abatement in Ben-David et
al.). However, as shown by Holthausen (1979), if a firm under output price uncertainty
is allowed to write forward contracts, risk aversion affects only the amount of output
hedged, not the amount of output produced. In this sense, the production decisions and
the financial decisions are separated.
An important paper from the viewpoint of the thesis is Blair (1974). He considers the
choice of inputs when input prices are uncertain, and finds that risk-averse firm uses less
each risky input compared to that of a risk-neutral firm. This result follows because the
marginal cost of an input is affected by uncertainty and by the firm’s risk attitude.2
The issue of permit price uncertainty is important also in practice. This is so in
particular in the EU-ETS. For example Blair’s result may change in an emissions trading
model, since input use may depend on the position of the firm in the permit market
either as a buyer or a seller. Also, the literature related to emissions trading is short
2A significant paper related to emissions trading under uncertainty is Baldursson and von der Fehr
(2004). In addition to the effects on the optimal choices of the firms, uncertainty is relevant also for the
choice of environmental policy instruments in general. This is discussed in the so-called prices versus
quantities–literature started by Weitzman (1974) and continued by Stavins (1996) among others.
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of the studies about forward trading, and Holthausen’s conclusions have not yet been
studied in this context.
2.2 Market power
Market power can be a problem for example in the output market or in the permit market.
The models in the literature are often based on a dominant firm-competitive fringe setting,
where one or more firms have a dominant position for example in the permit market and
are thus able to influence the market price of permits. The firms who are in the competitive
fringe act as price takers. Market power in the output market is typically modelled either
as monopoly or as Cournot competition.
For concreteness, consider a permit market with two dominant firms, firm 1 and firm
2, and a competitive fringe. Assume furthermore that the dominant firms are Cournot
competitors in the output market, and that the fringe firms behave competitively in their
own output market. This situation can be modelled as follows. The dominant firms have
first mover advantage and therefore take the optimal choice of the fringe as given. The
objective function for one of the dominant firms, say firm 1, is
P (x1 + x2)x1 − C1(x1, e1)− p(e1 + e2)(e1 − e
0
1), (2)
where the choice variables are output x1 and emissions e1. The inverse demand function
for the output is P , the cost function is C1, and the permit supply function is p. The
parameter e01 is the initial allocation of permits for firm 1.
This model encompasses several of the most important contributions in the literature.3
For example, suppose that there is a single dominant firm in the permit market, who is
a price taker in the output market. For this case Hahn (1984) showed that the initial
allocation of permits matters for the cost-efficiency of emissions trading, and emphasized
3See Montero (2009) for a more detailed review of the literature related to market power, and Requate
(2005) for a review related to market power and environmental policy instruments in general.
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that the inefficiency due to market power grows with the distance between the initial
permit allocation and the permit need of the dominant firm.4
When market power is introduced also to the output market new issues arise in the
role of strategic interaction. The first step to this direction is Misiolek and Elder (1989).
They let one of the firms to be able to influence the permit price and also the output price.
They show that in this case the dominant firm may manipulate the permit market in order
to drive the rival’s costs up, thus gaining a higher market share in the output market. The
duopoly setting (2) is, among other things, studied by von der Fehr (1993) with a two-stage
model, where the firms use emissions as a strategic variable to influence the competition in
the output market. One interesting result is that the firms overinvest in permits relative to
competitive level. Other studies related to market power are Eshel (2005) and Sartzetakis
(1997). Eshel studies the optimal allocation of permits and Sartzetakis carries out a
welfare comparison between tradable and non-tradable permits under market power only
in output market.
In practise policy makers and researchers have been interested in the effects of market
power. For example, market power in both output and permits markets is a real concern
in the EU-ETS (Hintermann 2011). These worries demand further research, in particular,
related to strategic interaction between firms.
2.3 Noncompliance
Emissions trading and also other policy instruments such as emission tax must be en-
forced and monitored properly to yield the desired outcomes.5 If firms’ emissions cannot
be measured accurately, the firms may either try to find ways to cover up their actual
4Recent contributions to the literature on market power in permit markets are Malueg and Yates
(2009) and Lange (2012), who allow every firm to have market power. This is important, since in the
discussed modelling framework the firms are divided by the modeller to ones that have market power and
to the ones that do not (Lange 2012).
5The seminal contributions in this strand of the literature include Hartford (1978, 1987).
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emissions or, if required to self-report their emissions to the regulator, underreport their
emissions. In either case it can be expected that the cost-efficiency property fails. The
regulator may audit firms and sanction penalties for underreporting, but since auditing is
expensive, not all firms will be audited (or found guilty of underreporting). Therefore the
choice of emissions is made under uncertainty concerning auditing and the risk attitudes
of the firms may play a role, although risk-neutrality has been a common assumption in
the literature. Besides assumptions regarding risk attitudes of the firms, an important
modelling choice is related to the probability of auditing. There are basically two options
for the modeller: either the regulator knows (or sets) the probability of auditing that the
firms employ, or not.6
As an example, the maximization problem for a risk-neutral firm can be stated as
max
{e,eˆ}
{−C(e)− p(eˆ− e0)− S(v)}, s.t. e ≥ 0, eˆ ≥ 0, v ≥ 0, (3)
where e denotes the actual emissions and eˆ denotes the reported emissions. The violation
v is defined as e − eˆ. The cost function is C. The function S is the expected penalty
function defined as the product of the auditing probability and the penalty function
set by the regulator. This problem can be regarded as a simplification of the model in
Malik (1990), who was the first to study monitoring and enforcement issues in emissions
trading. Malik’s important finding is that the cost-efficiency condition no longer holds.
Other studies related to emissions trading are Keeler (1991), Malik (1992, 2002), van
Egteren and Weber (1996), Stranlund and Dhanda (1999), Montero (2002) and Arguedas
et al. (2010). The literature on noncompliance contains only one study, Montero (2002),
where the welfare difference between emissions trading and emission tax are studied under
6The case where the regulator knows the probability can be named as objective probability (for
example Stranlund 2007). In the other case, where the regulator does not know the probability firms
employ in their optimization we say that the probability is subjective. Note that although a certain
fraction of firms are audited, a particular firm may think that its choices, such as the level of violation,
affects the chance of the firm belonging to the set of audited firms. In this sense, the regulator does not
know the probability the firms thinks it gets audited.
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noncompliance. Montero finds that both instruments yield the same welfare if the cost
and benefit functions are known with certainty.
2.4 Banking
Many emissions trading programs in practise allow firms to bank permits for future use
and/or to borrow permits from the future endowments for current use. For instance, in
the EU-ETS banking is allowed but so is borrowing, because the permits of a given year
must be handed over after the date when next year’s allocation is received (Chevallier
2012). This essentially means that borrowing is allowed at least to some extent in the
EU-ETS. Also, in the United States the American Power Act allows participants to bank
and borrow permits, although an interest must be paid for the borrowed permits and the
borrowing of permits is limited (Leard 2013).
The added benefit of permit banking and borrowing is to allow firms to reach cost
savings by adjusting the time paths of emissions. One of the first papers to study banking
are Cronshaw and Kruse (1996), Rubin (1996), Kling and Rubin (1997) and Schennach
(2000). As for the example model of banking and borrowing we follow Rubin (1996): a
firm that is allowed to bank and borrow permits maximizes the discounted value of the
benefits from emissions over the planning interval [0, T ].7 The problem is therefore to
max
{e(t),x(t)}
∫ T
0
e−ρt [−C(e(t))− p(t)x(t)] dt (4)
s.t B˙(t) = e0(t) + x(t)− e(t), B(0) = 0, B(T ) ≥ 0, (5)
− xmin ≤ x(t) ≤ xmax, e(t) ≥ 0. (6)
Here the firm chooses the time paths of emissions e(t) and permit trades x(t). Parameter
ρ is the discount rate. The differential equation in (5) is the state equation describing
the change of the number of permits in the bank account B at time t. Furthermore there
7See Xepapadeas (1997) for the design of environmental policy under stock externalities.
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are bounds for the control variables x and e that are given in (6). Using a similar model
Rubin shows that the firms choices result in at most the cost as would result when the
regulator solves the total-cost minimization problem with full-knowledge of the firms’ cost
functions. He also studies the time path of emissions.
Although permit banking is not a market imperfection as such, all of the market
imperfections considered so far are relevant also when banking is allowed. For example,
Liski and Montero (2005) use a model of dominant firm with a competitive fringe to
analyse the effects of market power, when firms are allowed to bank permits. However,
from the viewpoint of this thesis the models related to noncompliance and banking are
the most interesting ones. This type of analysis is conducted only in one paper, Stranlund
et al. (2005). They analyse the design of monitoring and enforcement that results in full
compliance, and find among other things that constant penalties can be used for this. In
article 4, discussed shortly in subsection 3.4, we extend the results of Rubin (1996) and
Stranlund et al. (2005) by allowing the firms to be noncompliant and to bank permits.
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3 Summaries of the articles
3.1 Article 1. Lappi, Ollikainen and Ollikka: Optimal fuel-mix in
CHP plants under a stochastic permit price: Risk-neutrality
versus risk-aversion
We consider the input choice of a risk-averse combined heat and power (CHP) producer
operating under permit price risk. We use a mean-variance framework to analyse the
consequences of changes in expected permit price and in variance of the permit price on
the choice of three fuels of which two are CO2-intensive and one is clean. We develop two
models. In the first one the producer is only allowed to make spot-trades in the permit
market, and in the second one the producer also has the option to make forward-trades.
We find in the spot-model the expected results that an increase in the expected permit
price increases the use of the clean fuel. Also, an increase in the variance of the permit
price increases the use of the clean fuel, when the producer is a buyer of permits, and
decrease the use, when the producer is a seller. This is intuitive since a risk-averse permit
buyer can decrease the need to buy permits in a risky price by using more clean fuel. In
the forward-model we essentially derive the well-known separation property of production
and financial decisions under uncertainty, which was discussed in subsection 2.1. This
property means in this context that the fuel use depends only on the certain fuel unit
price and on the forward price of permits. In this case the risk aversion, price risk and
the initial allocation of permits affect only the amount of permits hedged.
The policy implication of these results is that for the emissions trading program to be
cost-efficient, the forward markets for permits must be operational and the producers must
have access to them. Otherwise, the initial allocation of permits affects the optimal choice
of fuels. We also use the model to estimate the size of the risk-aversion coefficients for
Finnish CHP-producers. With a simple econometric exercise we found that risk neutrality
suits the producer behavior better than risk aversion.
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3.2 Article 2. Lappi: Duopolists in output and permit markets:
Interaction and regulation
We study firm behaviour in imperfectly competitive permit and output market using a
two-stage duopoly setting similar to von der Fehr (1993). The differentiating feature is
that the stages are inverses relative to von der Fehr, namely, we assume that the choice
of permits is conditional on the output choice. Therefore output acts as the strategic
variable. It seems plausible that this order of moves is more relevant to some of the
current emissions trading programs such as EU-ETS.
We show that the total output is greater when the firms are able to influence the
outcomes in both of the markets as permit buyers compared to the case where permit
markets is competitive but output market is not. When the firms are permit sellers the
opposite result is obtained, that is, the total output contracts.
In addition to the effects of strategic interaction we analyse possible regulation to
counteract the negative effects of imperfect competition.8 When the duopolists are permit
buyers, they buy fewer permits compared to competitive markets. Therefore it seems
reasonable that a subsidy for permit buying may increase efficiency. This is exactly the
case as shown in the paper. If the duopolists act as permit sellers, then a tax increases
efficiency. In both cases the regulation is designed to induce cost-efficient abatement,
which is not itself sufficient to increase efficiency since the effect on output markets needs
to be taken into account. However, as shown in the paper, total output is greater with
regulation than without it.
8The regulation is an adaptation of the tax/subsidy scheme presented in Kim and Chang (1993).
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3.3 Article 3. Lappi: Emissions trading versus emission tax un-
der noncompliance: welfare comparison
We perform a welfare comparison between emissions trading and emission tax under the
assumption that the firms must self-report their emissions to the regulator. In effect, some
of the firms may be noncompliant. This is important since some of the trading programs
have achieved full complaince but some have not (Chan et al. 2012, Montero et al. 2002).
The main result of the study is that welfare under emissions trading is at most the welfare
under emission tax; the welfare is the same only when all firms are compliant.
To reach this conclusion we first show the intuitive and well-known results that the
equilibrium permit price is increasing in the number of compliant firms and that actual
emissions of a firm are greater when it is noncompliant than compliant. Under emission
tax the actual emissions are the same irrespective to the compliance status of the firm.
It is then shown that the main conlusion of the paper follows from these observations
assuming that the instruments are set to their first-best levels. The key elements used are
that the equilibrium permit price is not greater than the tax, and that actual emissions
differ between instruments.
This result is in sharp contrast to the result obtained by Montero (2002), who found
that the instruments yield the same welfare (under certainty). Although the modelling
approaches are quite different, the divergent results may follow from the assumptions
regarding the auditing probability function. Montero assumes that this probability is
constant and set by the regulator, but we assume, that the probability is subjective and
nonlinear in violation, and cannot therefore be set by the regulator.9
9The assumption that the probability of auditing depends on the level of violation, which the regulator
does not directly observe, is often employed in the literature (for example Arguedas et al. (2010), Malik
(2002), van Egteren and Weber (1996) and Rousseau and Proost (2005)). The rationale to condition this
probability to something that the regulator does not observe is that the regulator receives a noisy signal
of the violation (Rousseau and Proost 2005), which can be for example high level of output but low level
of reported emissions.
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Since noncompliance yields lower tax revenues for the regulator, we also conduct a
brief study of a model where the regulator sets the tax or the initial allocation of permits
to be auctioned under budget constraint.
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3.4 Article 4. Lappi: Emissions trading, noncompliance and
bankable permits
We combine two strands of literature, noncompliance and banking literatures, to analyse
the effects of noncompliance in an emissions trading system, where the participants are
allowed to bank and borrow permits. Similarly to the model in the third article, we
assume that the firms hold subjective views on the probability of auditing, and that the
resulting expected penalty function is nonlinear. We also assume that firms must self-
report their emissions to the regulator. The model in article 3 is static, but the analysis
in this study is conducted in a dynamic framework using optimal control theory. The
starting point of the model is therefore Rubin (1996), which we expand to analyze the
effects of noncompliance.
The main contributions of the study are the characterization of the condition for
noncompliance and the analysis of the time paths of actual emissions, reported emissions
and violations. The condition for noncompliance is also studied in Stranlund et al. (2005),
who use a discrete-time model and constant, objectively known penalties. Quite similarly
to Stranlund et al. (2005) we find that full compliance can be achieved by pinning the
expected marginal penalty to the going permit price. More exactly, we show that a firm is
compliant if and only if the discounted expected marginal penalty at zero violation level
is greater than equal to the permit price. But it may not be possible for the regulator
to set the penalty function that produces full compliance simply because the auditing
probability is subjective. Therefore it is important to study the effects of noncompliance
on the time paths of actual and reported emissions.
To this end, the condition for noncompliance can be used. We show, that for a
sufficiently long planning interval, at most two interesting instants of time exists. In the
first the firm starts cheating, and in the second the reported emissions become zero and
the actual emissions become constant. Additionally, actual and reported emissions are
18
decreasing in time and violation level is increasing in time.
The results imply that some given penalty scheme may be efficient, in the sense that
it implies full compliance, during some initial interval of time, but may turn out to be
inefficient later on. Therefore the results have two messages for the regulator. It is a
good idea to keep the planning interval short, if one only wants to induce full compliance.
Also, if full compliance is desirable, make sure that the firms have little reason to form
subjective probabilities over auditing, that is, make it clear that firms understand that a
fixed proportion of them are going to be audited.
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